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Abstract 
 
Farmers  in  the  EU  do  not  trade  greenhouse  gases  under  the  Kyoto 
agreement. This is an empirical puzzle because agriculture is a significant 
contributor of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the EU and may harvest private 
net gains from trade. Furthermore, the US has strongly advocated land-use 
practices as ‘the missing link’ in past climate negotiations. We argue that 
farmers have relatively low marginal reduction costs and that consequences 
in terms of the effect on permit price and technology are overall positive in 
the EU Emission Trading System (ETS). Thus, we propose a project-based 
system for including the farming practices in the EU ETS that reduces the 
uncertainty from measuring emission reduction in this sector. The system 
encourages GHG reduction either by introducing a new and less polluting 
practice or by reducing the polluting activity. When doing so, farmers will 
receive GHG permits corresponding to the amount of reduction which can 
be stored for later use or sold in the EU ETS. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The EU has committed itself to an ambitious 20 % reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG) by 2020 
compared to the 1990 emissions level. Moreover, the EU goal beyond 2012 is to strengthen, expand 
and improve climate change initiatives (Commission, 2008). Therefore, there is a strong need to 
consider more carefully how to integrate as many sectors as possible in these efforts. 
  
One important tool to improve climate change initiatives is emission trading. Thus, the EU launched 
the world’s first Emission Trading System (ETS) for GHG on January 1 2005 as part of the efforts to 
comply with the target levels in the Kyoto Protocol. The ETS is a unique innovation in modern 
environmental  regulation,  which  has  been  transferred  to  the  EU  based  on  successful  American 
experiences (Svendsen, 1998). In the EU ETS, the ownership of one permit or ‘allowance’ gives the 
right to emit 1 ton of CO2 equivalents. Once the allowance has been used to show compliance in a 
given year, it will be withdrawn from the market. As long as the allowances have not been used to 
show compliance, they stay in circulation, and all allowances are identical regardless what year they 
have been issued. A market for trade with carbon permits is an ingenious way to reach the desired 
target level – the cap and trade ensures that there is an upper limit for total emission and that GHG 
reduction in terms of carbon equivalents takes place at the cheapest and most cost-effective facility 
(Markussen and Svendsen, 2005). 
 
The EU ETS implies that trade of GHG allowances (as translated into CO2 equivalents) can take 
place between firms in different countries. Almost half of total CO2 emission in the EU is covered 
by the market, including more than 10 000 installations (Commission, 2008). Sectors differ across 
countries according to their ability to reduce GHG. East European countries, for example, have 
plenty of opportunity to close inefficient state monopolies and thereby obtain easy reductions. In 
contrast, countries like Denmark and Germany are already energy-efficient and do not have the 
same ‘low-hanging fruit’-possibilities to reduce GHG as businesses in countries with less efficient 
industries. Actually, Denmark’s situation, for example, has worsened by the fact that 1990, the base 
year for the free allocation of permits (assigned amounts units) was a ‘wet’ year in the sense that it 
rained a great deal in Scandinavia. Denmark, therefore, imported large amounts of hydropower 
from Norway and Sweden that year, and its own fossil-based electricity production consequently 3 
 
remained at a modest level. In other words, Denmark’s GHG permit allocation is lower than it 
would have been in a normal production year. 
 
There are numerous ways to reduce GHG, e.g. via wind turbines, solar and wave power, bio fuels, 
energy efficiency measures and – a more recent method – a change in farming techniques. Farmers, 
however, do not trade GHG under the Kyoto agreement. Why not? We suggest that they should. 
The idea of including farmers in a national emission trading system has been launched in Australia 
(Maraseni 2009; ABARE 2010) but it has not yet been applied to the EU. This is our contribution to 
the literature. 
 
This in spite of the fact that the United States heavily advocated the inclusion of change in land-use 
practices during the heated climate negotiations with the EU in The Hague, year 2000 (Svendsen, 
2003). Furthermore, agricultural productivity may in itself be affected by climate change in the EU 
as relatively small changes in the climate can have significant impact on agricultural productivity. 
For instance, current differences in crop productivity between northern and southern Europe are 
likely to increase under climate change. Exceeding crop-specific high temperature thresholds are 
likely to result in a significantly higher risk of crop failure in parts of Southern Europe, while 
Northern Europe may be able to grow a wider range of crops than is currently possible because of a 
warmer and longer growing season. Therefore, crops which are presently grown throughout Europe 
experience more positive impacts in northern Europe compared with southern Europe (Commission, 
1996). Recently, the Commission has stated, that: ‘In the long run, climatic pressures may lead to 
further marginalization of agriculture or even to the abandonment of agricultural land in parts of the 
EU’ (Commission, 2009).  
 
The main GHG emitters in the EU-27 are listed below in Table 1. As seen, agriculture is a significant 
source of GHG emissions, being responsible for 9.2 % of total GHG emissions in 2005 (Copa-
Cogeca, 2008). 
 
TABLE 1 APP. HERE. 
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Table 1 shows that Public Electricity and Heating Production is the greatest GHG emitter in the EU 
with 27.8 % of total emissions. Transport is second (19.5 %) and manufacturing/construction third 
(12.7 %). Agriculture ranks number four (9.2 %). 
 
At the moment, three of the great GHG emitters are not covered by the EU ETS, namely 2. Transport, 
4. Agriculture and 6. Residential. Thus, while the debate on GHG has mainly focused on the energy, 
industrial, and residential sectors and households, only very limited attention has been paid to the 
significant potential to limit GHG emissions in the agricultural sector in spite of the fact that it 
emits about one tenth of total GHG emissions in the EU-27. 
 
Much uncertainty is involved in the measurement of emission of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide 
(N2O) from farming. This has so far been seen as an obstacle to the inclusion of the farming sector 
in the EU ETS (Monni et al., 2007). There are reasons to believe that some of the uncertainties can 
be effectively reduced with new knowledge (see Olesen, Fog and Svendsen 2010). 
 
Our overall research question is therefore: Is it possible to develop a system that may facilitate the 
inclusion of farmers in the EU ETS? We will try to develop a framework which may circumvent 
much of the remaining measurement uncertainty and also makes sense in economic terms. 
 
Our approach is to use economic theory to analyse the stated research question. First of all, we 
analyse the effect of including new sources into a TPS by considering the changes this implies for 
the demand and supply curves in such a market. The advantage of this analysis is that it enables us 
to draw conclusions about the likely development in the allowance price from including the farming 
industry into the EU-TPS. The effect on the price and its implication for the incentives to develop 
new technologies are relevant for the ability of the TPS market to deliver sufficiently to the overall 
climate targets of the EU. Our conclusion on this point is that the benefits of including the farming 
industry  outweigh  the  small  (if  any)  adverse  effects  of  doing  so  (in  terms  of  slightly  smaller 
incentives to develop and implement new cleaner technologies). 
 
In the second part of the analysis, we again build on economic reasoning and the above described 
set-up to derive a system for the inclusion of the farming industry into the EU-TPS. This system 
takes care of the uncertainties associated with the net reduction of greenhouse gasses from various 5 
 
farming techniques. Our analysis suggests that land-based practices can fruitfully be included into 
the EU-TPS. We propose a dynamic system where the various farming techniques and activities are 
frequently evaluated and if sufficiently certainty is provided, can be included as valid allowance 
generating activities.  
 
We answer this research question in the following way: First, we focus on private gains for farmers 
from participating. If potential private net  gains exist, attracting both  conventional and organic 
farmers  to  the  system  will  be  politically  more  feasible  (Section  2).  Next,  we  focus  on  market 
consequences. What happens to the market in terms of changes in the permit price (Section 3) and 
technology  (Section  4)  when  farmers  are  included?  As  mentioned,  a  severe  problem  regarding 
agriculture as a diffuse non-point source is the GHG measurement problem. Therefore, in the line of 
the previous sections, Section 5 proposes a project-based system that attempts to cope with the 
measurement problem in an economically efficient way. Finally, Section 6 gives the conclusion. 
 
2. Private gains 
 
2.1 Low-hanging fruits 
 
Agriculture mainly emits methane and nitrous oxide besides carbon dioxide. The GHG emissions 
profile of agriculture, however, is fundamentally different to that of other sectors like industry, 
households and transport, as it is dominated by methane and nitrous oxide. Methane arises from 
enteric fermentation by ruminant animals and from manure, while the application of organic and 
inorganic  fertilisers to  soil can produce nitrous oxide. These are  inherently variable, biological 
processes (Copa-Cogeca, 2008). 
 
A huge potential for relatively cheap GHG reductions in agricultural ecosystems appears to exist. 
Picking  the  ‘low-hanging  fruits’  implies  relatively  low  marginal  reduction  costs  (MRC).  For 
example,  improved  cropland  management  (including  nutrient  management,  tillage/residue 
management and water management), improved grazing land management (e.g. grazing intensity, 
nutrient  management)  and  the  restoration  of  degraded  soils.  Also  sink  enhancement  (carbon 
sequestration),  low  energy  production  facilities,  biofuels  (also  for  own  use),  improvements  in 
efficiency of agricultural productivity and the minimization of transportation distance are important 6 
 
options. The mitigation potential of agriculture is estimated to reach 5.5-6 Gt. of CO2 equivalents 
per  year  by  2030.  This  potential  is  enormous  relative  to  the  emissions  of  agriculture,  which 
represent 13.5 % of global anthropogenic GHG. 89 % of this potential can be accounted for by soil 
carbon sequestration; 70 % of the total mitigation potential can be realized in developing countries. 
Furthermore, significant benefits associated with soil organic carbon storage make sustainable land 
management a solution to the interrelated issues of poverty, resilience and sustainable development 
(IFAP, 2009). ‘Over the next decades,  adaptation will need to  go beyond mere adjustments of 
current practice’ (Commission, 2009).  
 
Organic  farming,  in  particular,  is  interesting  with  respect  to  the  empirical  puzzle.  First,  organic 
farming is likely to stabilize productivity because it is more resilient to climate change because of 
efficient  nutrient  cycles  and  soil  management,  and  a  tendency  to  promote  higher  biodiversity. 
Because organic farming preserves soil fertility and maintains, or even increases, organic matter in 
soils, this farming technique is in a good position to maintain productivity in the event of drought, 
irregular  rainfall  events  with  floods,  and  rising  temperatures.  Soils  under  organic  management 
retain  significantly  more  rainwater  thanks  to  the  ‘sponge  properties’  of  organic  matter  (FIBL, 
2006). 
 
Second, research conducted over the last decade also indicates that organic farming production 
methods may have an even higher potential to reduce GHG emissions than conventional farming. 
To a large extent, this difference in emissions is caused by the non-use of chemical fertilizers. When 
emission reduction is measured per hectare, the reduction potential appears to be very impressing. 
Fliessbach (2007) estimates that GHG emissions from organic farming systems are 35-37 % less per 
hectare compared to organic farming, but when emission reduction is measured on the basis of 
production output, emissions reductions are significantly lower as a result of lower yields in organic 
farming. Nevertheless, organic farming still has significant potential for GHG emissions in the 
arable sector, while the potential is more modest in the livestock sector and negative for vegetables 
(Halberg, 2008). Furthermore, based upon Danish data, Dalgaard et al. (2002) and Dalgaard et al. 
(2003) find that the extent to which emissions decrease depends on the way in which livestock 
production is adjusted to lower crop yields. If livestock production is upheld at pre-conversion level 
and fodder is imported to compensate for lower crops yields, the decrease in GHG emissions are 7 
 
significantly lower compared with a situation in which livestock production is adjusted to lower 
crop yield. 
 
 
2.2 Grandfathering 
 
Auctioning without compensation is probably not a politically feasible solution. A more ‘soft’ start 
involving some kind of grandfathering is likely to be more politically successful (Svendsen 1998). 
Thus,  in  order  to  make  the  system  politically  attractive  to  farmers,  plentiful  permits  could  be 
allocated to them initially, as has been done in the first phase for other sources in the EU ETS 
(ibid.). Farmers would then have the possibility to obtain an economic net gain from participation in 
the EU ETS. What policy instrument would an economically rational grouping prefer? One rational 
choice could therefore be the grandfathered permit trading model, i.e. initial free distribution of 
historical emission rights (Tietenberg, 2000). This is the distribution rule applied in practice so far 
in the United States and in the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
The distribution rule of grandfathering consists in a free transfer of the property rights to emission 
rights to polluters. The idea is exemplified in the following way: If a firm emitted 100 tons of 
carbon equivalents in 1990 and is ‘grandfathered’ its 1990 level, this firm will receive 100 carbon 
permits, each permit entitling it to emit one ton of carbon equivalents. If its carbon emission is cut 
by 5 % in 2000 by regulators, the firm’s permit holding will be devalued to 95 permits for 2000. In 
this respect, the use of grandfathering corresponds to the use of standards (Command-And-Control). 
Grandfathering maintains the status quo. The only difference between standards and permit trading 
is the shift in property rights from public authorities to the polluter. Under permit trading, permits 
would now be transferable, in contrast to standards in which permits are non-transferable. In this 
way, permit  trading may  be politically  attractive to  producers because  it offers them historical 
emission rights freely when based on grandfathering (Daugbjerg and Svendsen, 2001). 
 
Grandfathering provides rent to existing firms, as opposed to new firms that have to buy their way 
into the market. So, the winners are all existing firms (who obtain their permits at no cost) whereas 
the losers are future firms (who have to buy all their permits from existing firms). As the future 8 
 
losers are not represented in the political arena, lobbies representing existing firms will dominate 
the political decision-making process in their favour (ibid.). 
 
3. New sources and permit price 
 
This section provides a simple graphical presentation of the consequences of including additional 
sources in an existing ETS. In the ETS, supply and demand determine market price. Note, however, 
that this not an ordinary market since a source may be either a demander or a supplier, depending 
on the market price compared to the shadow price of the permit allocation for this source.  
 
FIGURE 1 APP. HERE 
 
Let   be the permit price in the ETS. From an ordinary marginal emissions reduction costs curve 
(MRC), it is possible to derive the individual firm’s demand and supply for permits, see Figure 1. 
Here, firm   initially has an emission level of  . It receives a number of permits given by  . 
Therefore, without any trading, the reduction target for this firm is   with a resulting shadow value 
of the firm’s reduction target, given by .  If   then the firm sells permits, and if 
 the firm buys permits. From Figure 1, it is easy to derive the supply and demand 
function for this firm, which is done in Figure 2. Whether a firm is a buyer or a seller depends on 
the price in the market relative to the shadow price of the reduction constraint for the firm  . 
The maximum demand for the firm is  , which is the amount that the firm needs to reduce. By 
buying   permits, it will not have to reduce any. In the same fashion,   is the largest number of 
permits that the firm is able to sell. If it reduces all its emissions, it can sell all the received permits 
from the regulator. 
 
FIGURE 2 APP. HERE. 
 
Given that the firms (sources) have sufficiently dissimilar marginal reduction costs ( s), we 
reach an ordinary market supply and demand by adding up the sources’ individual   and   curves, 
as seen in Figure 3.  
 
FIGURE 3 APP. HERE. 9 
 
 
Note that the market equilibrium depends on the initial allocation (and number) of permits, since 
both the demand and the supply functions are functions of   (as should be clear from Figure 2). 
 
Given this set-up, we can now analyse the consequences of including new sources into such a 
market. The overall conclusion is that if the new sources on average have lower   than the 
existing sources, the price in the market tends to fall. If, e.g., agriculture has lower   (or lower 
shadow values), the permit price tends to fall. The implications are that some selling sources turn 
into buying sources. And there will be a transfer of reduction from the original sources to the new 
sources. If, on the other hand, agriculture has higher  , the price in the market tends to increase. 
The implications are then the opposite as before. Some buying sources turn into selling sources. 
And there will be a transfer of reduction from the new sources to the original sources.  
 
 
4. Incentives to develop new technology 
 
In this section, we will look at the likely consequences of including the farming industry in the ETS 
in  terms  of  developing  new  and  cleaner  technology.  What  is  the  property  of  dynamic  cost-
efficiency? An additional reason for using an ETS compared to a non-tradable (standard) solution is 
exactly that the ETS provides larger incentives to develop/apply new, cleaner technologies. To 
show this, we compare the incentives created by these two instruments. Suppose that a firm is 
subject to a non-tradable situation with a reduction target of  . In the ETS, the firm receives 
permits such that it also reduces  without trade. To compare a situation with ETS and a non-
tradable case, let us initially set the permit price such that the firm does not trade at all. This implies 
that the reductions in the two situations are the same when we look at the original technology. To 
illustrate the difference, see Figure  4. Here,    represents  the original technology, while 
 represents a new and cheaper way of reducing emissions.  
 
An additional benefit from the ETS is that the firm can now reduce more cheaply and therefore has 
an incentive to reduce more and sell the additional permits at the prevailing market price. Thus, as 
shown in Figure 4, the firm reduces  additional units of emissions. The area   is the excess 10 
 
benefit compared to the non-tradable situations. In this case, there are two effects. First, the firm 
obtains additional cost savings, and second, it emits less. However, as long as the overall number of 
permits is fixed, the total emission will not be reduced. 
 
FIGURE 4 APP. HERE. 
 
Given that developing new technology is costly, it is more likely that the new, cleaner technology is 
more profitable to develop under the ETS system than under the non-tradable situation. There is a 
caveat to this result. In the above example, the price in the market is assumed constant. But if more 
firms start adopting this new technology, the price in the market will fall, and the gain from the new 
technology will be smaller. In the limiting case, in which all firms would experience the same cost 
reduction from applying the new technology, the situation would be status quo and no additional 
gain would be experienced compared to the standard.  
 
Finally, the inclusion of new sources that reduce the price in the market will lead to a decrease of 
the incentives to develop new technologies. This final point is illustrated in Figure 5. If the price in 
the market falls from   to  , the cost savings in the ETS compared to the non-tradable 
situation shrinks from area B to area C.  
 
FIGURE 5 APP. HERE. 
In conclusion, lower prices in the ETS provide fewer incentives for development and/or application 
of newer technologies. On the other hand, lower total compliance costs will make implementation 
of more stringent reduction targets less politically controversial. 
 
 
5. A system for including farmers into an ETS 
  
According to EEA (2009), EU farming contributed 9 % to the total EU-15 GHG emissions in 2007, 
whereas nitrous oxide accounted for 5 % and methane for 4 %. The contribution mostly comes from 
cattle (CH4), and direct and indirect soil emission (N2O), and a minor emission from swine (8% of 11 
 
the total emission from farming). The uncertainty attached to these measurements is considerable. 
The paper of Monni el al. (2007) in detail describes the great uncertainties related to measuring 
emissions of nitrous oxide and methane. According to their findings, great uncertainty is attached to 
N2O emissions from agricultural soil in particular. Annual emission from EU 15 is app. 190 Tg 
CO2e, but with great uncertainty, with a lower and upper bound of 95 % confidence interval of -100 
to +1000% as a percentage relative to the mean. According to Monni et al. (2007), the reason for 
this is that emission is caused by complex biological processes with various changing parameters. 
 
On the other hand, new research indicates that recent techniques for measurement, based on already 
existing data from both conventional and organic farmers, can reduce uncertainties to some extent 
(see  Olesen,  Fog  and  Svendsen,  2010).  Moreover,  emission  inventories  are  calculated  for  any 
sector, including the farming industry. The IPCC (2006) provides a series of reduction factors that 
are used for this purpose. Applying such an approach to an individual farmer is the centre of the 
scheme we propose here. 
 
In the following, we propose a system that can be used for including the farmers in the ETS, even 
though uncertainty and measurement problems exist.  
As a starting point, farming contains a number of processes, like keeping animals, or producing 
crops. Each of these processes can be subdivided into activities like keeping different animals. 
Finally, for each such activities, different practices exists, like which fodder to give cows. The basic 
idea of this system is that instead of measuring the emission directly, we calculate the (average) 
change in emission from the baseline practice to the new practice. The whole idea of the system is 
that the authorities can in advance specify what practices should be accepted as valid reduction 
measures. (This could be motivated, e.g., by not including practices that are judged to generate 
uncertain results). We only want to illustrate our idea, therefore we here only focus on changes in 
practices  and  not  on  changes  in  activities  of  processes,  but  this  be  included  without  much 
complication.  
 
Assume a number of farmers,  ,  are chosen to enter an ETS. (A criterion could be to 
only include farmers of a minimum emission level). We have to specify an allocation rule for the 12 
 
initial allocation of allowances to the farmers. Call the allocation rule  . As an example, a 
uniform allocation rule   allocates to each farmer   at time   a number of allowances: 
 
With  , and where   is the calculated emission in (the end of) the previous period. If  , 
there is no requirement of net reduction from the sector in this period, while for any  , there is 
a requirement of net reduction from the sector in this period. 
 
Now  let  us  look  at  how  to  calculate  emissions  from  activities  and  practices.  Let  a  number  of 
activities be  . For each such activity, there is a number of practices, indexed by 
. Each activity practice pair has an emission factor per unit of measurement (E.g., one 
cow fed with fat food has an emission factor of  , while the emission factor of conventional food 
is  ). If a farmer switches from conventional to fat food, the emission reduction per cow per year 
is given by:  . More generally, we call the units   (in the above example a cow) and 
activity practice pair the emission factor for  .  
 
Let us now turn attention to reduction projects of farmer  . Such a reduction project in our setting is 
a change in  practice from  a baseline (BL) practice to  a new practice.  We write the change in 
emission per unit activity as  . We introduce time as   to indicate that permits are 
valid in a limited period of time. To simplify, assume that farmer   total has    reduction 
projects. 
1Reduction from project   for farmer   is given by  , i.e.to make this 
model work, we need to specify all the  ’s, as this also defines the  ’s and all the  ’s. (Here, we 
ignore the case that   could also be changed. But this is easily included into the model.). Finally, 
total reduction is given by  . 
 
How many allowances must farmer   hand in at the end of the period? This is calculated in the 
following way, where   means the number of allowances that farmer i must hand in to 
the authorities in the end of period t:  
                                                       
1 So if a farmer has two activities and for the first changes two practices and for the second 1,  .  13 
 
 
So for each type of activity,  , we calculate the reduction due to changed practices (there could be 
more than one practice for an activity, or for subsets of this activity). Subsequently, we sum over 
the reductions for each activity to obtain the total reduction. This sum is then subtracted from the 
emission level of this source at the beginning of the period. This provides the number of allowances 
that the farmer must hand in. If this sum is lower than the initial allocation, the source can sell from 
the remaining allowances. If the sum is larger than the initial allocation (which is possible either 
when   and no reduction undertaken, of  , but emission increased), this source must buy 
additional allowances. In appendix 1, we present an example of how this system works.  
 
TABLE 2 APP. HERE. 
 
Fødevareministeriet (2008) states that the total potential for reducing emissions from farming in 
Denmark is estimated to be 3851 MtCO2e per year, which amounts to 31 % of the emission from 
agriculture and 6 % of the total emission (year 2007). However, incentives to choose new practices 
depend on (net) costs of these new practices and the  . In Table 2, we show the most promising 
practices in terms of size and costs. 
There are, however, even more effective ways of reducing emission, which is not included in Table 
2. According to Fødevareministeriet (2008) and Chatskikh et al. (2008), reduced tillage (and direct 
drilling), which are methods that reduce labour and energy efforts, show a great CO2e reduction 
potential. The reductions can mainly be attributed to reduced energy uses, increased storage of CO2 
in the soil and net changes in the emission of nitrous oxide. The studies conclude that the total 
emissions reduction is app. 370 kg CO2/ha, with approximately 90 % stemming from storage. Other 
studies are, however, not so optimistic with respect to the potential of carbon sequestration from 
reduced tillage. According to Baker et al (2007), the problem is that most studies only examine 
samples to a depth of 30 cm or less, while the few samples providing data for larger depth show that 
conservation tillage actually results in loss of carbon compared to traditional tillage. (See also Wang 
et al.  (2004) for similar results). These authors conclude that other management practices may 
ultimately be more fruitful for carbon storage.  
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This again underlines the strength of our proposed system. As long as too much uncertainty is 
attached to a method, it should remain outside the system, but it sends signals where to improve 
research. E.g., VandenByggart et al (2003) analyze data for Canada finding correlation between 
decreased background levels of soil organic (SOC) and the potential to store SOC when non tillage 
is adapted. From this they conclude that management like plowing green manures into the soil, and 
applying  N  and  organic  fertilizers  were  the  practices  that  tended  to  show  the  most  consistent 
increases in SOC storage. According to Dalal et al. plowing methods also affect the release of 
nitrous oxide: For manure management, the most effective practice is the early application and 
immediate incorporation of manure into soil to reduce direct N2O emissions as well as secondary 
emissions from deposition of ammonia volatilised from manure. See also Iqbal (1992) for an earlier 
study of the connection between denitrification and the soil contend of carbon and Dorland and 
Beauchamp  (1991)  for  a  study  of  the  linkage  of  denitrification   and  ammonification.  These 
examples show how new research gives increased knowledge that can be applied for new methods 
to enter the system. 
 
Our approach will most likely reduce such costs significantly, since it proposes a list of acceptable 
methods and associated factors of reduction which are then standard to all farmers. This means a 
system without significant certification and verification costs. The list of acceptable methods could 
e.g. be proposed and delivered by the EU. Moreover, the system would make the allowances earned 
in this sector a valid and reliable ‘currency’ in the EU ETS. 
 
At present (May 2010), the price of allowances is app. 13€/tonnes CO2. If comparing this price with 
the reduction costs in Table 2, such a price will, all else equal, only imply minor reductions from 
the farming sector. There are, however, two reasons to expect that this will underestimate the future 
potential for reductions in the farming sector, if it is included in the EU ETS. 
 
The first reason is that in an ETS, as already stressed in the previous section, the participants have 
incentives to find new and/or cheaper ways of implementing these measures, implying that costs of 
the above measures fall. The second reason is that if the third phase will be implemented, the 
allowance price is likely to increase once the number of allowances is reduced.  
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Finally, we proposed a scheme that may be considered a project-based approach, in which the 
regulator  in  advance  makes  a  list  over  farming  practices  that  can  be  used  as  valid  reduction 
measures in the EU ETS system. This brings about the question of which practices to include? One 
reasonable criterion would be  to only include practices in which the uncertainty is minor. The 
uncertainty here could relate to measurement uncertainty or simply lack of understanding of the 
underlying biological/chemical processes. As new research reduces such types of uncertainty or 
new methods that contain less uncertainty are developed, the list of acceptable practices can be 
expanded.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The EU is facing a great challenge under the Kyoto Protocol in its ambitious efforts to improve 
climate change initiatives and achieve a 20 % GHG reduction from 1990 to 2020. Crucially, the 
participation of farmers could  be one extra important  tool for the European Union to  succeed. 
Overall, the inclusion of both conventional and organic farmers in the EU ETS offers a solution 
which meets the interests of farmers and the EU as  a whole. If the challenge of incorporating 
agriculture in the EU ETS can be addressed adequately, indeed, the role of farmers in climate policy 
may become a hot issue during future climate meetings. As a result, the US would probably be 
much more likely to rejoin the Kyoto agreement (or rather the post-Kyoto agreement), thereby 
clearing the road for the participation of China and India as well. Until now, the US has strongly 
advocated land-use practices as ‘the missing link’ in past climate negotiations. Finally, farmers may 
avoid future production losses as climate change evidently may have a significant economic impact 
on agriculture in near future. 
 
How  to  develop  a  system  for  including  farmers  in  the  EU  ETS?  This  research  question  was 
motivated  an  empirical  puzzle,  namely  that  farmers  may  harvest  private  net  gains  from 
participating. Recent surveys clearly indicate that farmers face relatively low marginal reduction 
costs. Low hanging fruits exist both within conventional farming and, perhaps, organic farming in 
particular. Farmers as a group may gain significant benefits from GHG trade. Furthermore, the 16 
 
option of grandfathering rather than auctioning would be the first step to attract farmers to the 
system. 
 
We argued that there were also other strong economic reasons to develop a system for farmers’ 
participation in the EU ETS. First, the market consequences in terms of the effect on permit price 
and technology were overall positive. Regarding the effects on the price of allowances, it was not 
likely that the inclusion of the farming industry would have a significant influence on the price 
because of its relatively small size compared to the overall emissions. It would, however, imply a 
larger  volume  of  trading,  resulting  in  cost-efficiency  gains.  Incentives  to  development  and/or 
implementation  of  new  and  cleaner  technologies  were,  however,  also  largely  affected  by 
expectations of future allowance prices. An increase in the allowance price was to be expected in 
the future, which would generally spur incentives for technology improvements. This was also 
likely for the farming industry, making more and more new practices attractive. Note that being in 
an ETS provides continuous incentives to make new practices cheaper or more effective, even if the 
price  of  allowances  remains  constant  (compared  to  ordinary  CAC  regulation).  Therefore,  the 
estimates of present costs of reductions for the various measures (like the one presented in table 2) 
typically exaggerated costs for applying these measures in the future.     
 
Based on these economic arguments, we proposed a project-based system that makes it possible to 
overcome some of the potential shortcomings from including farmers into the EU ETS, which have 
been  put  forward.  First  and  foremost,  farmers  would  increase  measurement  problems  and 
uncertainty significantly as emissions are a non-point source. The project-based framing makes the 
system resemble a joint implementation arrangement. A project in this system is an approved way 
of  reducing  emissions,  either  by  introducing  a  new,  less  polluting  practice  or  by  reducing  the 
polluting activity. In this system it is possible to control the uncertainty by only including the least 
uncertain elements. As new and better information is available, new practices can be included, such 
that the system also is flexible. Finally, it still provides the farmers to invest in GHG reducing 
activities.  When  doing  so,  farmers  will  receive  GHG  permits  corresponding  to  the  amount  of 
reduction which can be stored for later use or sold in the EU ETS. In this way, the farmers may be 
included, without increasing the uncertainty in the EU ETS significantly.   
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APPENDIX 1 
Example (numbers are totally random). 
Consider a situation with three farmers and two activities. Activity 1 has two possible practices, while 
activity 2 has three practices. So far, all the farmers use the practice that has the highest emission factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assume that F1 uses   instead of   and that F2 uses    instead of  . F3 does not change practice over 
the period.  
 
Calculate the initial emissions: 
  
  
  
 
sum                                = 106 
 
Calculation of net reductions:  
  
 
  
 
sum                                        = 20 
 
Let   
The first period allocation of allowances is given by:  
  
  
 
 
sum                                = 95.4 
 
 (Baseline)  0.7 
   0.5 
 (Baseline)  0.4 
   0.5 
   0.2 
Farmer  U1  U2 
F1  30  40 
F2  20  50 
F3  10  70 21 
 
The number of allowances to hand in and the surplus allowances: 
 
  
Surplus allowances for farmer 1:   
 
  
Surplus allowances for farmer 2:   
 
  
Surplus allowances for farmer 3:   
 
The total surplus of allowances is: 7.5 
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Figure 1: Marginal reduction curve 
 
 
   
Reduction 
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Figure 2: Individual firms’ demand and supply for permits  
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Figure 3: The market for permits  
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Figure 4: A selling firm 
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Figure 5: Cost reduction of new technology: Comparing ETS with a standard. 
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Figure 6: Lowering of price in the ETS reduces incentives to develop new technology 
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Table 1: GHG emissions from different sectors in the EU-27, 2007. 
 
Sector  % 
1. Public Electricity and Heat Production  27.8 
2. Transport  19.5 
3. Manufacturing Industries and Construction  12.7 
4. Agriculture  9.2 
4. Industrial Processes  8.5 
6. Residential  8.5 
7. Commercial/Institutional  3.3 
8. Waste  2.8 
9. Petroleum Refining  2.7 
10. Fugitive Emissions from Fuels  1.7 
1.1. Agriculture/Forestry/Fisheries  1.5 
12. Manufacture of Solid Fuels and Other Energy Industries  1.4 
13. Solvent and Other Product Use  0.2 
14. Other (Not elsewhere specified)  0.2 
Total  100.0 
 
Source: EEA (2010) 
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Table 2: Potential reduction measures, their size and costs 
 
Type of measure  Reduction potential
1 
(Denmark) 
Reduction cost
2 
(€/tonnes CO2e) 
Bioenergy 
Straw for energy production                      298  15 
Manure management  807  90 
Willow chips  1270  Sandy soil: 55 
Clay soil: 92 
Energy maize  531  179 
Domestic animals 
 
Adding fat in cattle feed 
above standard 
298  43 
Nitrification inhibitor  272  191 
Cropland management  
  
Summer catch crops  280  n.a. 
Set-aside of agricultural area 
on lowland 
295 
 
29 
Grassland 
 
247  911 
Agroforestry 
 
321  911 
Source:  Danish  ministry  of  Food,  Farming  and  Fisheries  (Fødevareministeriet,  2008  [Our 
translation]).  Note:  Numbers  do  not  include  any  reduction  of  domestic  animals  since  it  is 
assumed that a reduction in one country region will increase the number of animals elsewhere. 
1 Estimated potential for reduction of GHG from farming until 2020 (1000 ton CO2e per year).  
2  Numbers  are  costs  to  the  farmers  of  implementing  the  measure.  C-storage  in  soil  is  not 
included.  
 